Abstract. We compare and contrast twelve functions that have been proposed for the purpose of quantifying partisan gerrymandering. We consider functions that, rather than examining the shapes of districts, utilize only the partisan vote distribution among districts: partisan bias; the efficiency gap and several of its variants; the mean-median difference and the equal vote weights measure; the declination and one variant; and the lopsided-means test. We determine which historical elections are viewed as the most extreme outliers under each measure. As part of this examination, we highlight elections for which various pairs of measures arrive at very different conclusions. We also compare the measures' evaluations on a number of hypothetical elections.
Introduction
A partisan gerrymander occurs when one political party draws electoral district lines to their own advantage. A number of measures have been proposed as aids to identifying partisan gerrymanders. In this article we focus on those that evaluate how voters for each party are distributed among the various districts in the election. The seats-votes curve was considered more than forty years ago [Tuf73] . Partisan bias was explored more than twenty years ago in [GK94a] . The efficiency gap, a measure introduced in [McG14] by Eric McGhee in 2014, has ushered in a plethora of additional options, including the declination [War18b] (a measure of differential responsiveness) by the author.
There have been several efforts to compare proposed measures. McGhee and Stephanopoulos [SM17] explore the extent to which each of a number of measures adheres to various desiderata. These analyses are performed by considering historical and simulated elections in the aggregate. In [BDK + 17], the authors consider an overlapping set of measures, but do so with different evaluative criteria applied in the context of two specific elections. Nagle [Nag15, Nag17] also compares and contrasts a number of measures both on theoretical grounds and in the context of a handful of specific elections. We refer the reader to [Tap18] for an expository review of many of the "wasted vote"-derived measures.
In this article we take a different tack to that taken in the aforementioned studies. Rather than focusing on just one or two elections or on elections in the aggregate, we identify the three elections each measure considers the most unfair from both a set of 1179 elections dating back to 1972 as well as the three from a subpopulation of "competitive" elections. These extreme elections for each measure are, presumably, the ones it considers most likely to be partisan gerrymanders. In order to avoid the difficulties inherent in extracting a signal from elections with very few districts, we have restricted our attention to elections with at least 7 districts. Certainly we would expect some measures to function better than others on small district plans, but we leave this investigation for another study.
We also find it constructive to highlight elections on which given pairs of measures are in greatest disagreement. Of course, the interpretation of which measure is more "correct" in such disagreements is a subjective one. Nonetheless, we believe that an extensive list of historical examples will prove useful as individual measures are subsequently validated or discarded. And for those measures with demonstrated merit, such examples should prove useful in highlighting their strengths and weaknesses. We augment these examples with evaluations on a collection of twelve hypothetical elections. This is done as an additional means of highlighting the electoral features each measure flags as problematic.
The measures we consider in this article are closely related in that they all look at the partisan vote by district. Most are closely tied to the seats-votes curve, that elusive function by which votes are turned into seats. But the measures vary widely in how much scrutiny they have been subjected to. The efficiency gap, explored extensively in [MS15] , has achieved prominence through its usage in Whitford v. Gill [Wis] and has in many ways become the de facto standard for partisan gerrymandering measures. In spite of this success, or perhaps because of it, it has been the subject of numerous harsh critiques (see, e.g., [Gri, TC17, BD17] ). And while we have specific reservations about the efficiency gap, we find it to be one of the more reliable measures in our study. On the other hand we have measures such as the surplus gap, mentioned almost in passing in [TC17] , for which there has been essentially no study.
As we summarize in more detail in Section 9, we find essentially four measures with at least moderate degrees of merit: the efficiency gap, partisan bias, the mean-median measure and the declination (or its buffered variant). However, we find partisan bias and the mean-median to be much less robust than one would infer from a cursory review of the literature. The variants of the efficiency gap, while perhaps attractive on theoretical grounds, uniformly do not fare well when confronted with actual data. We find the equal vote weights test much less compelling than its authors [MB15] do and have serious reservations about the lopsided means test.
1.1. Issues not addressed in this article. Our primary goal in this article is to evaluate measures of partisan gerrymandering. Of course, how exactly gerrymandering is recognized and, ultimately, quantified is the subject of this paper. Consequently, we cannot give a purely satisfactory answer at this time. We can be clear, however, that we consider overall competitiveness to be an independent issue that, to the extent that it is a cause, or part, of gerrymandering, it is so only within the context of bipartisan (i.e., incumbency) gerrymandering. Said another way, assessing a district plan according to whether it will aid or hinder competitiveness is a worthy goal. But we consider competitiveness as a confounding factor for our question and one that should not provide a strong signal to partisan gerrymandering measures. Other types of gerrymandering, such as racial gerrymandering, can, and often do, occur in concert with partisan gerrymandering, but do not address them in this article.
The measures we consider rely only on the distribution of partisan voters among districts. The shapes of districts have long been viewed as a symptom of gerrymandering. And, while we do not discount the utility of such compactness measures, we do not consider them here. Nor do we consider the role of computer simulations in providing a baseline for what a fair district plan can or should look like. Nonetheless, we view both of these alternative approaches as important, complementary approaches to the vote-distribution measures considered in this article.
We also limit our analysis to the realm of quantification of gerrymandering: We do not include any discussion of the legal aspects of the gerrymandering problem. Discussions such as those in [MSLK15] on the constitutional basis for supporting a given measure are beyond the scope of this article. Nor do we attempt to create a "manageable standard" that can be readily used by the courts (see, e.g., [MS15] or [Wan16b] ). Such aspirations, while laudable, add a significant level of complexity to the issue. Furthermore, quantitative measures of gerrymandering can prove useful outside of the courts. Even if a measure cannot directly serve as justification for the invalidation of a district plan on constitutional grounds, it can still serve as an aid to a redistricting commission evaluating submitted plans, for educational outreach, or for helping our understanding of issues such as the geographic distribution of partisans.
1.2. Outline of article. Following a short Section 2 needed to frame the problem, we introduce the measures we consider in this article in Section 3. In particular, we consider the efficiency gap and five variants; the declination and one (new) variant; the mean-median difference; and partisan bias. We also consider the lopsided-means test as well as the equal vote weight test. As these last two tests don't simply associate a number to every election (they also include a test for significance), we treat them slightly differently. After presenting some population-level data for these measures, in Section 4 we identify outliers from our population of historical elections. In Section 5 we move on to evaluating hypothetical elections while in Section 6 we identify elections for which the most promising measures most strongly disagree. We follow with a few additional comparisons in Section 7 and, in Section 8, some comments on criteria that have been proposed elsewhere for evaluating gerrymandering measures. We close in Sections 9 and 10 with a discussion and our conclusions.
Gerrymanders and gerrymandering
In order to evaluate gerrymandering measures, we need to describe carefully what it is we wish to measure. We will distinguish in the following way between gerrymandering (i.e., a verb) and a gerrymander (i.e., a noun). For us, gerrymandering is the process of attempting to create a map that illicitly favors one or more groups. The extent to which the gerrymanderers are successful in achieving their aims may have legal importance, but it does not affect their intent. In this sense, determining whether or not someone is gerrymandering is not (assuming full information) a difficult question: What are the motives for the choices they are making?
Defining a gerrymander is a trickier matter. It can't just be the lines on a map -maybe those contorted lines keep communities of interest together. On the other hand, we can't expect a measure such as those we will discuss in this article to be able to know the intent of the map drawers, so we need to allow a gerrymander, as a quantitative matter, to be created by accident or by external influences such as geographic constraints. As such, it is reasonable to define a partisan gerrymander as a district plan that gives a notable advantage to one party. (Of course, each measure will define and measure "advantage" differently.) Implicit in this definition of a partisan gerrymander is some background, expected distribution of partisan supporters. And implicit in this distribution is an expected level of statewide support for each party.
What happens when the support for a given party ebbs or flows? Some authors 1 argue that a gerrymander exists independently of the ebb and flow of partisan support and that the corresponding measures of gerrymandering should recognize the gerrymander for what it is regardless of how the statewide support for each party changes. We do not believe this is most efficacious point of view. If one party suddenly becomes wildly popular, it likely doesn't matter at all how the lines are drawn: the opposing party isn't going to win a single seat. Why should we expect a simple function, based only on the partisan vote distribution to be able to recognize this as a gerrymander -as determined by the intent behind its creation -even when faced with the poor prognostications of the map drawers? Less drastically, why shouldn't a measure return a maximum value of unfairness for a given level of partisan support and gradually reduce in value as support deviates from the expectation?
The artist and her art serve as an appropriate analogue: A painter applying paint to a canvas is an artist and is creating art as that is her intent. Whether the end result is art is a different matter. She may be more or less successful in her efforts both in her own mind and by the standards of the time. For different viewers, cultures, or time periods, her art may be viewed as either brilliant or rubbish. The context matters.
1 For example: "Moreover, if a standard sometimes identifies the same set of districts as a gerrymander with respect to some elections and a non-gerrymander with respect to other elections, we know with assurance it is committing errors," pg. With this approach, a quantitative measure is asked only to identify the signature of a gerrymander. We take this to mean a vote distribution that would arise from packing and/or cracking. Ultimately, of course, the valuation of a measure must be interpreted with knowledge of both history and intent to be useful for the purposes of determining what is fair or legal.
Gerrymandering measures
In this article we will view an election with N districts as a triple E = (p, P, Q) consisting of two parties P and Q along with a sequence
where p i denotes the fraction of the two-party vote won by party P in district i. We assume each district is the same size and do not account for differential voting. We display our elections by plotting the p i values along a vertical axis with districts indexed along the horizontal axis as in Figure 1 . Let p be the statewide fraction of the vote attained by party P .
To aid the explication, we compute each measure introduced on the hypothetical, five-district election shown in Figure 1 . The plots we use throughout the article show the fraction of the vote won by the Democrats in each district. As many measures, notably the variants of the efficiency gap, are typically stated in terms of number-of-votes, we assume that each district in election E 0 has 100 total votes. Of course, without knowledge of the distribution of values of each measure over a suitable body of elections, the exact values computed in these examples are not particularly informative (though see Table 1 ). The point of the computations for E 0 is to help ensure that the definitions are properly understood by the reader.
Finally, we note that in [BGH + 17], the gerrymandering index and the representativeness index are defined as measures of gerrymandering. As these measures utilize simulated district plans in their definitions in an integral manner, we do not consider them here. Fortunately, all of the measures we do consider in this article can be combined with computer simulations if so desired.
3.1. The efficiency gap and its variants. The first class of measures we consider all rely on the notion of a wasted vote. In the context of the original efficiency gap (defined below), a wasted vote is a vote for a losing candidate or a vote for a winning candidate that is in excess of the 50%+1 needed to win. Following others (see [Cov18, Nag15, Nag17]) we define a slightly more general function that incorporates a parameter λ:
Votes for losing candidates are not affected by the parameter λ. When λ = 0, excess wasted votes don't count at all. When λ = 1, excess wasted votes are of equal weight as losing wasted votes. This is the weighting chosen in 2014 by McGhee [McG14] for the original efficiency gap. When λ = 2, any vote for the winning party in excess of what the losing party garnered is considered wasted. The only values of λ we know of that have been seriously considered in the literature are λ ∈ {0, 1, 2}, so we likewise restrict our attention to these in the rest of this article.
For each district we define w λ Q (i) analogously. The efficiency gap and its variants all work by comparing in some way the number of votes wasted by party P to the number wasted by party Q. For general λ, we can define (after Nagle [Nag17] ) the weighted efficiency gap,
Under this approach, an election is considered fair when Gap λ is close to zero. The first three measures below will correspond to λ ∈ {0, 1, 2}. A different generalization of the efficiency gap, the τ -gap, is introduced in [War18b] . It weighs wasted votes on a sliding scale (controlled by the value of τ ) according to how consequential the votes are relative to the 50% winning threshold. As we feel the declination (see Section 3.2) is a better measure than the τ -gap, we do not consider the τ -gap here.
(1) The efficiency gap [McG14, MS15] is defined as EG = Gap 1 . Note in this case that w 1 P (i) + w 1 Q (i) is the constant 1/2 for each i. As such, the efficiency gap ranges from -1/2 to 1/2. For election E 0 , the Democrats waste 160 votes while the Republicans waste 90 votes, yielding EG(E 0 ) = 0.14.
(2) The difference gap. It has been suggested in several places [Gri, Cov18, Nag17] that wasted winning votes in a district should be relative to the losing party vote rather than to the 50% threshold. (Which model is preferable depends in turn on how a party wins votesby getting non-voters to vote or by attracting voters who had been planning to vote for the opposition to its side.) This can be achieved by using a value of λ = 2. The difference gap is defined as DG = Gap 2 . Note that every vote is wasted in a district that votes uniformly for one candidate. This implies that the difference gap ranges from -1 to 1. For election E 0 , with each surplus vote counting double, the Democrats waste 200 (weighted) votes while the Republicans waste 120, yielding DG(E 0 ) = 0.16.
(3) Loss gap. Also considered in [Nag17] is the case in which only losing votes are counted as wasted. This can be effectuated by using a value of λ = 0. The loss gap is defined as LG = Gap 0 . It will range from −1/2 to 1/2. For election E 0 , the Democrats waste 120 total among their three losses while the Republicans waste 60 votes among their two losses, yielding LG(E 0 ) = (120 − 60)/5 = 0.12.
(4) The surplus gap. Cho assert in [TC17] that winning and losing wasted votes should not be treated equally. She proposes a winning efficiency (which we refer to here as the surplus gap), SG, that does not include votes wasted towards losses at all:
The surplus gap ranges from −1/2 to 1/2. For election E 0 , the Democrats waste 40 votes among their two wins while the Republicans waste 30 votes among their two wins, yielding SG(E 0 ) = 0.02.
(5) Vote-centric Gap, V C1. Nagle [Nag17] and Cover [Cov18] each suggest comparing the fraction of democratic votes that are wasted to the fraction of Republican votes that are wasted. Given a parameter λ we define
We abbreviate V CG 1 by V C1. The range of V C1 is −1/2 to 1/2. Since the Democrats gain a total of 260 among all five districts, V C1(E 0 ) = 160/260 − 90/240 = 0.24.
(6) Vote-centric Gap, V C2 = V CG 2 . The range of V C2 is −1 to 1. We use the weighted wasted votes computed for the difference gap to find V C2(E 0 ) = 200/260 − 120/240 = 0.27. McGhee showed in his original article [McG14] that, when all districts have equal numbers of votes, the efficiency gap treats an election as fair exactly when 2-proportionality is satisfied. (In this article we only consider the case of equal turnout among districts.) That is, if party P wins (50+x)% of the statewide vote, the election is fair when this earns (50 + 2 · x)% of the seats. Nagle [Nag17, eq. (2)] proves that equation (2) leads to (1 + λ)-proportionality (i.e., a responsiveness of 1 + λ) for Gap λ (under the same hypotheses). So the loss gap reduces to true proportionality: In a fair election, a party's seat share should equal its vote share. The difference gap corresponds to the very high responsiveness of 3-proportionality. The measure V C1 also treats an election as fair only if the seats won are directly proportional to votes won, however it evaluations deviations from this ideal differently than LG does. Similarly, V C2 scales the seats in a fair election by a factor of between 1 and 2 according to the average competitiveness in the election (see [Tap18] for an overview of these various proportionality reductions). We discuss in Section 4.1 the reduction of SG to a simpler function.
3.2. The declination and a variant. The declination, introduced in [War18b] , is essentially an angle associated to the vote distribution. (See [War18a] ) for a leisurely introduction.) It can be thought of as a measure of differential responsiveness, albeit one that is anchored at the actual statewide level of support between the two parties rather than at 50%. It depends on four quantities: the average winning margin of each party and the fraction of seats each party wins. If one party wins all seats, then neither the declination nor the buffered declination are defined.
Recall from equation (1) that there are assumed to be k districts won by party Q out of N total. Let k denote the number of districts won by party P (so k + k = N ). Define (half of) the average winning margin for parties Q and P , respectively, as
For E 0 , y = 0.1 and z = 0.2. (7) Declination. If k = 0 or k = 0, the declination is undefined. Otherwise, we set θ P = arctan 2z k /N and θ Q = arctan 2y k/N , then the declination is defined as δ = 2(θ P − θ Q )/π. It ranges between −1 and 1. For E 0 , we find that θ P = arctan(0.4/(2/5)) = arctan(1) = π/4 ≈ 0.78 radians while θ Q = arctan(0.2/(3/5)) ≈ 0.32 radians, so δ ≈ 2 · 0.46/π ≈ 0.29.
Note that the declination is not using the Democratic vote in the median district won by Democrats, but rather the mean of these values.
(8) Buffered declination, BDec. This is computed analogously to the declination except that we introduce m = N/20 districts with p i = 0.5 and m districts with p i = 0.5001 into the election (so k and k are each increased by m in equation (3)). It ranges between −1 and 1. The modifications of y and z can be interpreted as adding m evenly split districts to those the Democrats win and m evenly split districts to those the Republicans win. The rationale for doing this is that it buffers the angle in cases for which one side wins a small fraction of the seats. When the sides are evenly matched, there is little effect besides an overall reduction in values. For E 0 , the corresponding angles decrease to θ P ≈ 0.55 and θ Q ≈ 0.25, yielding BDec ≈ 0.19.
Miscellaneous measures. Two other popular measures are the following:
(8) Mean-median difference, M M . The mean-median difference, defined as M M = p−median(p) (for N odd, the median is p (N −1)/2 ; for N even, the median is defined as the average of p N/2 and p 1+N/2 ), has been considered by a number of authors such as [Nag15, Wan16b] .
Here p is the average of the p i , or, equivalently (assuming equal turnout in all districts), the statewide vote fraction for party P . For E 0 , p = 0.52 while median(p) = 0.45. Hence M M (E 0 ) = 0.07.
(9) Partisan bias [GK94a] , Bias. The partisan bias measure aims to evaluate the degree to which each party would win something other than 50% of the seats under the assumption that both parties hold equal statewide support. To do this, we first impose a uniform vote shift in each district: let p i = p i − (p − 1/2). The partisan bias is 1/2 minus the fraction of seats won by party P above 1/2: 1/2 − |{i : p i > 1/2}|/N . The partisan bias can range from −1/2 to 1/2. For election E 0 , p = (0.33, 0.38, 0.43, 0.58, 0.78). Under this uniformly shifted scenario, party P still wins 40% of the seats (2 out of 5), leading to Bias(E 0 ) = 0.10.
McGann [MSLK16] uses a measure of partisan symmetry proposed in [GK94b] that averages the bias over a range of Democratic vote shares between 45% and 55% (see discussion in [Nag15] ). Such averaging procedures could be implemented for most of the measures we consider in this article. As such, we feel it is more appropriate to consider the simple version of partisan bias defined above.
3.4. Conditioned measures. The measures of the previous three subsections provide quantitative measures for any election when defined. The following two proposals are partially tests (in the sense of McGhee [McG17b] ) rather than pure measures: the focus is not (only) on the numerical value associated to the election, but also on whether a given condition is satisfied and, hence, whether a threshold has been crossed that warrants remediation.
(10) Lopsided means [Wan16b] , Lop. This measure is computed as the average winning margin of party P minus the average winning margin of party Q. In the notation of (3), this is just z − y. While this can be used as its own, standalone measure, the lopsided means test (as proposed by [Wan16b] ) consists of determining if the difference in margins is statistically significant (at p < 0.05) using a Student t-test. For E 0 , the difference of the means is 0.1. A t-test does not find a statistical difference (not surprising given the small value of N ):
The t-statistic is 1.2 with a p-value of 0.32.
(11) Equal vote weights [BDK + 17], EV W . This is equivalent to the mean-median measure, but subject to the constraint that a gerrymander is indicated exactly when the party winning a majority of the statewide vote wins a minority of the seats. For E 0 , the mean-median difference is, as computed above, 0.07. Since party P wins a majority of the vote statewide but wins only a minority of the seats, the test fails.
3.5. Historical data. Our data set consists of state-level lower house elections since 1972 for which there are no multi-member districts, as well as US House elections since 1972. This data set, which we used in [War18b] , is described in detail therein. Two points are worth mentioning here, however. First, we ignore third party candidates; all p i represent fraction of the two-party vote. In cases in which there is not a candidate of both parties, we impute the vote fraction. Both issues are important for any application of these measures to real-world elections. In this article, however, we are focused on how each measure views various vote distributions and will not dwell on these matters. There are different possible choices for what partisan vote to assign to each district. In some situations, such as with computer-generated district plans or proposed plans that have not been used for actual elections, one is effectively forced to use some exogenous measure of partisanship such as the precinct-level vote for a national or state-wide office aggregated to the district level. When a district plan has been used in an actual election, one can simply take the appropriate historical vote results for the election in question. Each approach has its advantages and disadvantages. Most notably, when using historical votes for the particular district, issues such as incumbency and candidate funding are obvious confounders. One also must deal with uncontested elections. With exogenous data, one must worry about the level of correlation between the vote for the race one is interested in and the vote used. Each approach has its staunch advocates (see, e.g., the conversation in [McG18b] and [BDK + 18]).
In this article we use historical votes and impute votes for uncontested elections. So, for example, the vote fractions in Figure 2 are the actual district-level vote fractions for the 2014 US House election with the value of 0.399 imputed for District 9 since the Republican candidate ran unopposed. Using exogenous data would certainly change the particular elections that appear as extreme examples in Sections 4, 6 and 7. However, we see no reason to suspect that this would have any real impact on the utility of our investigations. The years and states of the outliers would change, but the general shapes of the vote distributions appearing in our data set of over 1000 elections would likely not.
With one exception, the presence of imputations is, for similar reasons, not an issue for the investigations of this paper. The one exception pertains to the Student t-test used in the lopsided means measure. As we discuss in Section 4.5, the imputation strategy utilized looks to have significant effects in this case.
3.6. The measures in aggregate. In this article we proceed under the assumption (see [SM17, II.D] for a related criterion) that most historical district plans have been, if not perfectly fair, approximately fair. As such, each measure, when applied to the historical record, should produce a distribution whose mean is close to zero. As seen in Table 1 , this appears to mostly be the case for the measures we are considering in this article.
In the Section 4 we will be considering which elections are seen to be the greatest outliers for each of the measures under consideration. For that section, it does not matter particularly how each Table 1 . Mean and standard deviation for the measures considered in this article applied to the 1166 elections in our data set with at least seven seats for which each party wins at least one seat.
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LG measure is scaled or that they have different scales. For Section 5, however, we will be comparing how a few hypothetical elections are evaluated. And for Section 6 we will be identifying particular elections for which there are strong disagreements among pairs of measures. For both of these purposes it will be convenient to rescale each measure for the remainder of the article so it has standard deviation equal to 1. We will denote the rescaled version of measure X by the roman (i.e., non-italic) notation X = X/σ(X) where σ(X) denotes the standard deviation of the historical distribution associated to measure the X. So, for example, the rescaled version of BDec will be written BDec. As we are exclusively interested in the relative, rescaled values in the remainder of the article, we do not expect the subtle difference in notation to lead to confusion. In Figure 3 we display kernel density plots for each rescaled measure on the historical elections in our data set. The plot has been split into three to avoid clutter; there is no significance to which of the three subplots a given (rescaled) measure appears. Note that with these unitless rescaled measures, a value of (say) 2 denotes two standard deviations above the mean. Also note that we are not normalizing the measures -that is we are not shifting the mean to zero. (We see no reason that biases, whether from gerrymandering or from the geographic distribution of partisans, should not lead to appropriately nonzero means.) Regardless, as seen in Table 1 , the mean is small relative to the standard deviation for most measures. We note that the standard deviation is quite small for the mean-median difference relative to the other measures. This has the potential to impact its ability to distinguish among fair and unfair elections.
As a third perspective, we show in Figure 4 scatter plots of various pairs of measures. For space reasons, we have omitted three measures we deem to be the least promising: LG, VC1 and SG (see Section 4). Since Dec and BDec differ materially only for a specific class of elections (i.e., those for which one party wins almost all of the seats) we choose to omit Dec from the figure. Note for reference that the Pearson correlation between Dec and BDec is 0.95. Finally, EVW has also been omitted since it is numerically equivalent to MM.
As BDec is not defined when one party sweeps all seats, the thirteen such races have been omitted for consistency from all comparisons in the figure. Each scatter plot thereby consists of 1166 points. It is readily apparent from the figure that EG, VC2, and BDec are all significantly correlated with each other, but only moderately correlated with the other measures. In particular, the correlation between EG and VC2 is 0.96, between EG and BDec is 0.92 and between VC2 and BDec is 0.91. The only other strong positive correlation is 0.91 between Lop and DG. The "bow tie" appearance of the scatter plot for MM and Bias arises from the fact (observed by McGhee and Stephanopoulos [SM17] and perhaps others) that the mean-median measure yields partisan bias when multiplied by the responsiveness.
One additional observation is the low correlations (0.50 and 0.61, respectively) between the efficiency gap and two of the other most oft-referenced measures, MM and Bias. This is not automatically concerning, a priori it is possible that MM and Bias are simply capturing relatively independent aspects of partisan gerrymanders. However, as we articulate in Sections 4, 5 and 6, we do not believe this is the case.
Evaluations
In this section we explore each individual measure in some detail. Each exploration consists of both a summary of some of the strengths and weaknesses we, and perhaps others, have identified as well as a listing of which historical elections are perceived as being the most unfair. In some sense, the most extreme elections are the least interesting: An election such as the 2012 North Carolina US House election sets off alarm bells no matter how one looks at it: the district plan was drawn by one party [Lev18] ; a politician involved in the process is on record admitting that it was a partisan gerrymander [Gan16] ; the seats won by the Democrats are far below their statewide vote (4 of 13 seats with 50.60% of the total vote [Wik18b] ); the proportion of seats won by Democrats is significantly less than what they won in 2010 even though their statewide support improved over 2010 (Democrats won 7 of 13 seats in 2010 with 45.24% of the total vote [Wik18a] ). A measure that tells us the plan is an outlier is telling us what we already know.
Measures such as the ones analyzed in this article will presumably be most useful in more ambiguous cases. Perhaps they will be used to lend support to a proposed plan being fair, to compare similar plans, or to analyze the impact of a policy change (see, e.g., [McG18a] ). Nonetheless, focusing on which elections are perceived as the least neutral has distinct advantages. First, it can help highlight which features of an election a measure is sensitive to, and which it is not. Second, if a measure generally aligns with the common wisdom, that can lend support to its validity as a measure.
In Table 2 we summarize the outliers for each measure among two different populations. For the first population, we restrict our attention to elections with at least 7 seats in which each party holds statewide support between 45% and 55%. There are 647 of these elections in our data set. We will refer to these as "competitive elections." By this we don't mean that the individual races are necessarily competitive, merely that the parties are competitive statewide. These elections appear to be the least taxing for partisan gerrymandering measures.
The second population considered is that of all elections (still with at least 7 seats). There are 1179 such election which we refer to as "all elections." In elections that are dominated by one party, the measures begin to break down in various ways. For example, in an election in which one party receives more than two thirds of the vote: the 3-proportionality of DG implies that is automatically unfair as one party cannot win more than 100% of the seats; the declination will be undefined if one party sweeps all of the seats; and the counterfactual required for partisan bias becomes daunting. Fortunately, even if a measure does poorly for non-competitive elections, it may still have a role to play for competitive ones. For the two declination variants, elections in which the measures are undefined are omitted from Table 2 . Similarly, for EVW, only anti-majoritarian elections are considered; for Lop only elections in which the t-test indicates statistical significance are considered.
In this and later sections, when we work with actual election data, we identify the Democratic Party with party P and the Republican Party with party Q. The way we have defined our measures, negative values will thereby indicate unfairness in favor of the Democrats while positive values will indicate unfairness in favor of the Republicans. 4.1. Variants of the efficiency gap. There is a significant amount of redundancy among the elections deemed to be the most extreme outliers by the variants of the efficiency gap. The surplus gap, however, comes to different conclusions; we defer discussion of this until the end of the subsection. Each of DG, EG, LG and VC1 reduces to proportionality in the sense that the elections treated as fair by each of these measures adhere to a linear relationship between votes and seats. As mentioned in Section 3, this constant is 1 for LG and VC1; 2 for EG and 3 for DG. The measure VC2 is similar except the acceptable proportionality depends on the average competitiveness of the races. Regardless, each of the measures discussed in this article agree that if a party wins half the statewide vote it deserves half of the seats. It follows that any competitive election for which the seat split is far from even will likely be an outlier, regardless of which constant of proportionality is expected by the measure. Indeed, Figure 5 illustrates the three most extreme competitive elections as judged by each of the five measures now under consideration. The only disagreement is between DG and the other four measures regarding the third-most extreme outlier. The skewed seat split in the Washington elections appears to stem directly from the high competitiveness of many of the districts. While VC2 does incorporate competitiveness into its evaluation, its maximum constant of proportionality is 2, even for the most competitive elections. The other four measures make no such allowance. The other two elections, in Ohio and Michigan, do indeed look like possible gerrymanders with the Democrats "packed" into a few districts. Note additionally that the Michigan election is anti-majoritarian.
In Figure 6 we display the three most extreme evaluations among the population of all elections. There is still some redundancy, but as the statewide support is now allowed to deviate significantly from 50%, the different constants of proportionality lead to significantly different evaluations.
The difference gap, DG, which prefers 3-proportionality, identifies elections in which the Democrats hold approximately two-thirds of the statewide vote, but for which the Republicans are still able to win a significant number of seats. In fact, the proportionality constants are below historical norms at 1.25 for the legislative elections and 1.5 for the congressional election. (See [Goe14] for computations of the historical responsiveness.) The Democrats would have needed to win over 100% of the seats in each case to please the difference gap. For the NY legislative elections, if it is a Democratic gerrymander, it is not a very aggressive one; there are very few Democratic seats that are even mildly competitive.
The measures LG and VC1 identify elections in which one party (the Democrats) sweeps all of the seats. The loss gap considers the Democrats to waste nothing as the loss gap only counts a vote as wasted if it contributes to a loss. The Republicans, on the other hand, waste all of their votes. Note that the 2010 election is the one in which they waste the most votes as, of the three years depicted, this is the most competitive statewide. Likewise, VC1 prefers seats to be proportional to votes, which is clearly not the case for these elections. We take this opportunity to reiterate that, as is the case with all of the historical elections considered in this article, we cannot conclude whether an election is the result of a gerrymandered district plan merely by examining the vote distribution. In the Massachusetts elections, cracking Republican voters could certainly lead to distributions very similar to the ones we do see. On the other hand, perhaps there just isn't a big enough pocket of Republicans to consistently win a seat.
Finally, in the last row of Figure 6 , we see that there is agreement among EG and VC2 for the two most extreme, but VC2 views the 2014 Massachusetts US House election as the third most extreme election whereas EG selects the 1994 Washington US House election. The features of these elections that cause EG and VC2 to judge them as such outliers are familiar from our previous remarks: The majority party wins a much higher percentage of seats than one would expect from 2-proportionality. And, even though there are a large number of competitive seats (especially in the Washington elections), neither VC2 or EG makes any special allowance for this.
We end our discussion of the efficiency gap variants with some observations on SG. The surplus gap looks as though it should be dual to the loss gap: It counts the votes wasted by the winners of a district instead of the votes wasted by the losers of a district. However, a short argument shows that the surplus gap of an election equals the statewide support of the Democrats minus one half. For example, in the election E 0 from Section 3, the (unscaled) surplus gap SG is 0.02 and the statewide Democratic support is 0.52. This equivalence with overall statewide support makes SG useless as a measure of partisan gerrymandering.
4.2.
The declination, Dec, and buffered declination, BDec. In Figure 7 we illustrate the outliers for Dec. The Ohio and North Carolina elections have the classic marks of a gerrymander: Relatively efficient wins for the majority party with a handful of overly safe seats going to the minority party. Each of the other outliers is marked by one party winning almost all of the seats. In such a scenario, the declination is very sensitive to the vote split in that one (or two, in the case of the Texas election) district won by the minority party. So while all of these elections fit the general paradigm for a partisan gerrymander, when one party wins so few seats the measure suffers from the same problem it might for an election with very few districts overall: There is only so much information that can be extracted from such an election. Additionally, while the Washington election might be a great gerrymander in an environment where future vote levels could be known accurately, in reality several of the Democratic districts are much more competitive than the Democrats would realistically aim for. The declination is unable to adjust for this fact.
Given the noise inherent in the situations in which only one or two districts is won by one of the parties, it seems advisable to buffer the declination so it is less susceptible to the changes in vote margin for those one or two districts. This is the logic behind the definition of BDec. And indeed, by reducing the value of the measure more for wildly uneven seat splits, we see in Figure 8 among the competitive elections three recent elections that have been widely characterized as egregious partisan gerrymanders.
In the population consisting of all elections, we still find elections for which one party wins a minuscule portion of the seats. Increasing the aggressiveness of the buffering function (see the value m in the definition of BDec in Section 3 would change the calculus as to which elections are the most extreme outliers, but it's not clear that there is a good reason to do so. It is true that all of these elections look on paper like strong gerrymanders, whatever their true causes.
Unlike the other measures addressed in this article (excepting BDec), Dec is undefined on elections in which one party wins all of the seats. This prevents the declination from being able to inform us for elections such as the recent ones in Utah: In 2014 and 2016, the Republicans won all four congressional seats with approximately 66% of the statewide vote. Having one party sweep the election is quite common in small elections. For elections with between 2 and 6 seats, sweeps occur approximately one third of the time (160 out of 367 elections). For elections with at least 7 seats however, they are much rarer, occurring only 1% of the time (13 out of 1179 elections). As such, we do not see the declination's inability to provide an opinion in such cases to be a significant drawback.
4.3. The mean-median difference, MM, and equal vote weights, EVW. There are remarkable similarities among the six outliers for the mean-median difference. For each, we have relatively few districts, most of which are not competitive. Given the definition of the measure, the uncompetitiveness follows to some degree from the definition of the measure for cases in which statewide support for each party is close to even. Independent of the measure, it is not clear why we should be especially suspicious of any of these elections as partisan gerrymanders. For the most part they are elections with equally matched parties and relatively even seat splits. The uncompetitiveness at most suggests bipartisan gerrymandering. Recall that the equal vote weights requires an anti-majoritarian outcome for there to be any suggestion of a gerrymander. Assuming there is such an outcome, the measure itself reduces to the mean-median difference. In Figure 10 we see the three most extreme outliers (i.e., largest mean-median difference in absolute value) among elections with anti-majoritarian outcomes. All three come from the subpopulation of competitive elections. Even more, all three are extremely competitive statewide. All three elections look mildly suspicious, but the razor-thin statewide margins call into question the robustness with which these elections would be identified by EVW as possible gerrymanders.
4.4. Partisan bias, Bias. Partisan bias is computed by uniformly shifted district-level support so that statewide support between the two parties is equalized and then comparing seat shares. When statewide support is equal between the two parties, the required shift is negligible, and partisan bias simply measures the degree of unevenness of the seat split. As such, the top three outliers in Figure 11 correspond to elections in which one party would win 77% of the seats under a (small) uniform shift to 50% support for each party. The Washington election seems innocuous enough given the number of highly competitive seats, but the two North Carolina elections certainly look more suspicious.
For the other three outliers, we find elections in which the shift does not lead to any seats changing hands. This will occur when the majority party holds comfortable majorities in the seats it wins. This, in turn, is a hallmark more of bipartisan gerrymanders than of partisan ones. Note that given the lack of competitive races, the "averaging" version of Bias mentioned in Section 3.3 would not return a different answer than Bias itself would in any of these three cases.
4.5. Lopsided means. The lopsided means [Wan16b] measure is computed as the average vote share of P in the districts they win minus the average vote share of party Q in the districts they win. In the notation of (3), this is just z − y. And, in fact, there are similarities between Lop and Dec when the election is competitive (for competitive elections they have a correlation of 0.78). Among the competitive elections shown in Figure 12 , two of the three most extreme outliers do look extremely suspicious. Among all elections, the three outliers are unremarkable other than the overwhelming degree by which the Democrats win each state -leading to "lopsided means."
While this difference can be used as its own, standalone measure, the lopsided means test, as proposed by Wang [Wan16b] , consists of determining if the difference in average winning vote shares is statistically significant (at p < 0.05) using a Student t-test. Setting aside the issue of how good the difference in winning margins is as a partisan gerrymandering measure, we now address the use of the Student t-test. While the other measures simply assign a number to each election, Lop claims to ascertain whether the winning margins of each party could have reasonably arisen by chance. While the venerable t-test is a workhorse of statistics, for the reasons outlined below, we do not believe that it is appropriately applied in the lopsided-means test.
The lopsided means test is predicated on the notion that unequal average winning vote shares are indicative of unfairness. This is true when the two parties have exactly equal support statewide: In this case, having a higher average winning vote share is equivalent to winning fewer seats. However, the logic behind this test fails even for moderate swings in statewide support. It is not difficult to construct symmetric vote distributions which, when shifted only slightly up or down, yield winning margins that go either up or down. Extreme examples of this phenomenon are exhibited in the second row of Figure 12 . Furthermore, such examples can be constructed so that the t-test sees them as statistically significant. In the other direction, one can create distributions that looked like strong gerrymanders (i.e., like the 2014 North Carolina US House election depicted in Figure 8 , but for which the t-test does not perceive significance. Together, these examples all call into question the appropriateness of the test.
Another issue with the lopsided means test arises when it is applied to an election with imputed vote values. While any measure will vary according to the imputation strategy, the t-test claims a precision that does not capture the true uncertainty involved. As an example, we consider recent Wisconsin state assembly elections as considered in Wang [Wan16a, Fig. 5A ]. For the 2010 election, for instance, Wang indicates a difference in average winning vote share of about one percent that is not statistically significant according to the t-test (t-statistic of −0.56 and p-value of 0.57). This value is computed using imputed vote shares of 0.75 and 0.25 for the winner and loser, respectively in each uncontested district. But since a significant fraction of the races in the election were uncontested in 2010 -31 out of 99 -a different imputation strategy can yield markedly different results. For instance, when we impute vote shares for uncontested races using a hierarchical model as in [War18b] , the difference in winning vote shares becomes about 3% and the t-statistic is computed as −2.15 which is statistically significant with a p-value of 0.03. For elections with few uncontested seats, the exact imputation strategy implied will be of minor importance. But when this is not the case imputed support, depending on how it is done, can lead to more confidence that a difference is statistically significant than is warranted.
Hypothetical elections
In Section 4 we focused on historical elections. Historical data gives the best sense of how each measure will perform in real-world applications. However, real-world data is messy. In this section we work with data from hypothetical elections. By choosing a small set of hypothetical elections of various types, we are able to easily compare which features of an election are viewed negatively by each measure and which are not.
With historical election data, it is difficult to completely separate the questions of "is this districtlevel vote distribution indicative of an inequity as to how the plan treats each party" with "was this district plan the result of gerrymandering." By working with hypothetical elections, we can focus on the mathematical aspects: Should our measure consider this a likely gerrymander? There is still room for disagreement but the realm of ambiguity is more constrained. Below are brief descriptions of the twelve hypothetical elections considered in Figure 13 and Table 3. A 1-proportionality. For moderate uniform swings this election is the ideal vote distribution according to LG and VC1. As with the other elections exhibiting proportionality, we see Figure 13 . Twelve hypothetical elections shown along with mean Democratic vote evaluated by various (scaled) measures utilized in Table 3 .
nothing unfair about this, even though, historically speaking, a constant of 1 it is not the norm in the US [Goe14] . B 2-proportionality. The ideal vote distribution according to EG. C 3-proportionality. The ideal vote distribution according to DG. D Sweep. Party P has swept the election with a statewide vote share of 64%. This particular election corresponds to a constant of proportionality equal to 5. This election is similar to many recent Massachusetts House elections (see, e.g., Figure 6 ). E Competitive. This election has a number of very competitive races that all have swung towards party P . We do not see significant evidence of a gerrymander. F Competitive even. Similar to the previous election, but with statewide Democratic average at 50% and no districts in the "counterfactual window" (i.e., between the majority party's statewide support and 50% -see [McG14] ). G Uncompetitive. An uncompetitive election as might arise from a bipartisan gerrymander.
Subject to the granularity enforced by there only being 10 seats, this appears relatively fair. H Very uncompetitive. The previous election with Republican and Democratic margins of victory increased by 30 and 20 points, respectively. The changes are not quite symmetric, but one would expect a measure that is not sensitive to overall competitiveness to evaluate election H similarly as it does election G. I Anti-majoritarian. This is election G subjected to a uniform swing in party Q's favor. A measure should mark this as an outlier and likely gerrymander -party P wins a majority of the districts with a minority of the statewide vote. J Classic partisan gerrymander. This distribution has all of the hallmarks of a partisan gerrymander: While the parties are evenly split statewide, party Q wins a significant majority through having a number of narrow victories in contrast to the party-P opponents who have fewer, and overwhelming, victories. K Inverted partisan gerrymander. This is dual to the classic gerrymander. While party Q has a significant majority of the vote, party P is still able to win a significant portion of the Table 3 . Values of scaled measures on hypothetical elections. The equal vote weights measure is not given its own column since it's numerically equivalent to MM; the only anti-majoritarian election is I. The t-test was not statistically significant for any of the elections.
seats through very narrow victories. From the point of view of a mathematical measure, we believe this should be treated as an outlier. Of course, in the US it would be quite unusual for the majority party to have sufficient control over the redistricting process to engineer such an outcome. L Mixed. With a uniform shift to equal statewide support between the two parties, this is a symmetric distribution. As is, it could be construed as a mildly pro-Democratic gerrymander.
The first four hypothetical elections we consider are linear for anything but very large uniform shifts. If a measure does not assume there is one ideal proportionality constant, each of these elections should be evaluated as fair. All of the variants of the efficiency gap do, in fact, evaluate at least one of these elections as more than two standard deviations from the mean. The declination variants (when defined), mean-median and partisan bias all view these first four as very fair. The lopsided-means measure has a moderate dislike for all of them (although none of the twelve elections has a statistically significant difference according to Lop).
The next four elections are unusual in various ways, but not suggestive of a partisan gerrymander, except perhaps for the "Uncompetitive" election G. The efficiency gap measures are unhappy with the high responsiveness of elections E and F; the partisan bias is unhappy with the unequal seat split after any requisite uniform shift. Most measures view elections G and H as being moderately pro-Democratic as is appropriate. The one notable aspect of the evaluations is that the value of MM doubles for election H as compared to that for election G, underscoring its dependence on competitiveness.
Of the last four elections, the first three are all ones we would expect to be viewed as strong partisan gerrymanders. The variants DG and VC1 fail miserably for election K. The mean-median difference and partisan bias recognize an asymmetry, but judge the advantage to be to the Republicans for both J and K. For election L, partisan bias and the mean-median difference evaluate the election as fair; Lop and DG perceive a pro-Republican bias. The remaining measure return what we view as the correct answer: a moderate Democratic advantage. 
Greatest pairwise disagreements
We next turn to an examination of which elections are evaluated most differently between various pairs of measures. These may be elections that are outliers or they may not. For instance, one measure might evaluate an election as a moderately pro-Democratic gerrymander while another evaluates it was a moderately pro-Republican gerrymander. Or one measure might deem an election as fair while another views it as extreme.
Attempting such pairwise comparisons for all measures considered in this article would be prohibitive. By focusing on four measures here, we need only consider six pairs. The measures we choose are the efficiency gap, the mean-median difference, partisan bias, and the (buffered) declination. The first three are popular measures. For example, these are the three incorporated into Planscore [MMJ + 18]; the mean-median difference has been incorporated into several articles attempting to create manageable standards; partisan bias is the forefather of these measures.
6.1. Buffered declination and partisan bias. Each of the competitive elections in Figure 14 is marked by two or three races lying in the counterfactual window between the statewide Democratic support and the 50% threshold. These districts will flip once the uniform shifted required by the partisan bias measure is applied. This causes partisan bias to evaluate these elections as relatively fair. The buffered declination, assigning the districts to the party that actually won them, not surprisingly comes to a different conclusion. Notice that Bias judges the minority party to be advantaged in each of these plans.
Among all elections, we see again that partisan bias and the buffered declination disagree about which party has received the advantage. In the 1992 Washington House election, partisan bias determines there to be an extremely strong Republican bias in the vote distribution due to the large number of narrow Democratic victories even though the Democrats win all but one seat with less than 60% of the statewide vote. In the 1974 Missouri and 1990 Alabama House elections, it is unclear why the Democrats should be viewed as having an advantage, as the partisan bias measure asserts, without appealing to some preferred level of proportionality: Viewed as states with naturally high responsiveness, these elections look reasonably, if not perfectly, fair.
6.2. Buffered declination and mean-median difference. First note that each of these elections in Figure 15 is marked by substantial symmetry around the mean Democratic statewide vote as well as comfortable margins for all of the majority party's wins. The buffered declination views each of these elections as fair (with the possible exception of the 1974 Alabama election) whereas the mean-median difference views them as strongly favoring the majority party. As noted in Section 4.3, the mean-median difference is penalizing elections for being noncompetitive. Noncompetitive races may be undesirable, but they are a somewhat independent issue from that of partisan gerrymandering. To the extent that uncompetitive elections are signs of gerrymanders, they are more likely signs of bipartisan (i.e., incumbency) gerrymanders rather than of partisan gerrymandering. As a final note, MM and BDec disagree not only in the severity of bias for these elections, but also in whom the bias favors.
6.3. Efficiency gap and buffered declination. Four of the six exhibited elections in Figure 16 are ones in which one party (the Republicans) wins only one seat. This is a class of elections for which both versions of the declination struggle. For the three competitive elections, both measures view there to be Democratic bias with EG viewing the bias to be much stronger than BDec does. In our estimation, BDec's valuation is more appropriate. Regardless, among the six pairs of measures considered in this section, the agreement for competitive elections is strongest between this pair of measures: both see the advantage as being moderate to strong and agree on which party has received the advantage. We see this as a notable level of concurrence.
For the three uncompetitive elections, the Republicans are barely able to eke out one seat. The buffered declination views this is an incredibly efficient win and evaluates the bias to be moderately strong in their favor. However, the vote distribution in each of the second row of elections looks very natural. It's not clear that the efficiency gap, with its evaluations of moderately strong Republican biases for the 1990 Georgia and 1996 Massachusetts elections fares any better. The efficiency gap does, we believe, make the correct evaluation for the 1972 Washington House election; if anything, the Republican victory in the one seat is narrower than one might have expected from the statewide distribution.
6.4. Efficiency gap and partisan bias. The six outlier elections in Figure 17 highlight the difference between how EG and Bias evaluate the contributions of very competitive seats (that is, ones within McGhee's counterfactual window). For the efficiency gap, they are very efficient wins that yield increased seat share but don't embody in themselves increased vote share. They therefore shift the bias in the given party's favor. For Bias, these races would flip under a uniform shift to 50% and hence are viewed as indicating an advantage to the opposing party. For five of these elections, the resulting seat split would be relatively even, so Bias sees no significant bias.
The 1992 Washington election highlights the phenomenon from the previous paragraph most clearly. According to Bias this is an extremely pro-Republican plan; according to EG is is extremely pro-Democratic. From our perspective, it is difficult to see how this could be called a pro-Republican plan. Allowing for the competitiveness of two-thirds of the districts, a moderately pro-Democratic valuation is probably the most appropriate conclusion, closer to the conclusion of EG.
6.5. Efficiency gap and mean-median difference. It is difficult to find any one pattern in the elections in Figure 18 . The efficiency gap, of course, wants 2-proportionality. The mean-median difference wants the median district to be close to the statewide average. Perhaps not surprisingly, EG is happiest with the uncompetitive elections whereas MM is happiest with the competitive ones. For four of the given elections, one measure evaluates the election as perfectly fair while the other evaluates it as extremely unfair. For the other two elections, the efficiency gap treats the election in question as moderately unfair while MM goes with extremely unfair. We would hesitate to call any of these as obviously unfair based on the vote distributions themselves.
6.6. Mean-median difference and partisan bias. Four of the six elections in Figure 19 are decidedly lacking in competitive races. Partisan bias, seeing no equalization of seat share under a uniform shift, pegs the three in states with unequal Democratic-Republican support as grossly unfair. They certainly lack symmetry about the statewide average, but the asymmetry shown is more indicative of bipartisan gerrymandering than of partisan gerrymandering. Regardless, the mean-median difference is unable to perceive the lone Democratic seat and concludes these are fair elections. 
Additional comparisons
For each of the competitive elections we computed the average (rescaled) value according to the efficiency gap, buffered declination, mean-median difference and partisan bias. In Figure 20 we display the eight elections for which the root mean square difference between the values of these rescaled measures and their average was the greatest. These can be thought of as the (competitive) elections for which there was the least consensus among the four measures. The results are generally consistent with the results of the factor analysis undertaken in [SM17] in which the declination and efficiency gap, which take into account seats won, load similarly to each other while partisan bias and the mean-median difference, which don't, in turn load similarly to each other.
In Figure 21 we illustrate for each of four measures the elections with rescaled absolute values closest to 0, 1, 2 and 3. By design there is an element of randomness to these selections. (There is, of course, nothing special about an election with rescaled partisan bias value of 1 versus 1.01.) The point is to display, for each measure, elections with increasing degrees of unfairness, according to that measure.
Proposed gerrymandering-measure criteria
In [McG14] (see also [McG17a] ), McGhee introduces the Efficiency Principle:
The Efficiency Principle: Any measure of efficiency must indicate a greater advantage for (against) a party when the seat share for that party increases (decreases) without any corresponding increase (decrease) in its vote share. He proposes this as a necessary principle that must be adhered to for any useful quantitative measure of partisan gerrymandering (see [Veo18] for an exploration of the efficiency principle and the efficiency gap when equal turnout is not assumed). While we are generally supportive of the principle, we are more inclined to support something akin to Cover's reworking of it [Cov18] .
Any measure of efficiency must indicate a greater advantage for (against) a party when the seat share for that party increases (decreases) without any corresponding increase (decrease) in its vote share unless its expected seat share decreases (increases) under plausible variation in that vote share. In Figure 22 we illustrated the 1986 North Carolina House election along with a shifted 1994 Virginia House election. By "shifted" we mean that we have increased the Democratic support uniformly in each district so that the statewide averages match at 57.5%. This pair of elections illustrates how BDec does not adhere to the Efficiency Principle: The Democrats win eight seats in the North Carolina election with the same statewide share of the vote that earns them only seven seats in the Virginia election, yet according to BDec. However, we believe BDec appropriately evaluates the relative security of the seats won in each election and does still adhere to Cover's modified version of it.
Another quality of measures seen as desirable is stability of a measure under changing electoral climates. This is advocated for Best et al. [MB15] . While in an ideal world stability would be easily achievable, our position is that the primary goal should be to measure the quantity of interest. There will be unavoidable noise in such a signal. This occurs, for example, when there are very few districts, but also occurs due to environmental factors. Some aspects of (various types of) gerrymanders may be more stable than others. For example, by their nature one would expect incumbency gerrymanders, by virtue of their lack of competitive races, to be relatively stable under electoral shifts. We would expect this to be slightly less true for partisan gerrymanders in which there is a more delicate trade-off between risk and reward.
In fact, we view too much stability as a sign that the measure is not capturing the essence of a partisan gerrymander: the ability to turn votes into seats. Elections G and I in Figure 13 underscore the importance of returning different answers in different electoral environments. From a purely quantitative view, election G looks like a bipartisan gerrymander with a slight Democratic advantage. Election I looks like a strong partisan gerrymander. A measure such as MM evaluates these two elections exactly the same.
Discussion
In this article we have attempted to illustrate how twelve quantitative measures of gerrymandering evaluate real-world election data. Each measure has its strengths and weaknesses, and, as McGhee [McG17a] has pointed out, there is no need to choose just one measure. The measures have been advocated for to different extents and subjected to various levels of investigation. Nonetheless, a number of things are clear.
First, a few of the measures are unusable as measures of partisan gerrymandering. The surplus gap is equivalent to the statewide support for a given party. Partisan gerrymandering can occur or not occur with essentially any level of statewide support; this is not a helpful measure. Likewise, LG, VC1 and DG are all measures of proportionality that do not comport with the historical "winner's bonuses" that are seen in actuality. It is unreasonable to adhere to a measure of fairness for which the majority of historical plans are automatically given to be far from fair. The final variant of the efficiency gap, VC2 is perhaps the most promising, though it's dependence on the overall competitiveness of the election is a mark in its disfavor. Given it's general concurrence with other efficiency gap variants, especially EG itself, there are not clear reasons, from the point of view of this article, to consider it separately. (We allow, however, that there may be legal reasons that make it more attractive.)
The lopsided means measure, by invoking a statistical test, implicitly promises statistical rigor. Even at the level of a simple measure it does not appear to hold much promise. Winning margins as such are only loosely connected to partisan gerrymandering. It is certainly not the rigorous measure of partisan gerrymandering it claims to be. The lopsided means measure is essentially a measure of differential competitiveness. Given that competitiveness is somewhat independent of partisan gerrymandering, it is not clear exactly what it is that Lop measures that is relevant. And, as discussed in Section 3, there are a number of issues relating to the appropriateness of the Student t-test as proposed.
The equal vote weights measure is a reasonable proposal assuming the validity of the meanmedian measure. It takes a conservative-sounding approach of restricting its attention to only elections that are anti-majoritarian. As it's creators acknowledge, this reduces its applicability. Fundamentally, though, it does not appear to flag particularly interesting elections. Anti-majoritarian is an unquestionable red flag, but it is not clear how the inclusion of the mean-median difference improves our ability to identify likely gerrymanders. We note that with the endogenous data we use in this article, only about ten percent of elections with at least 7 districts result in an anti-majoritarian outcome.
As noted previously, MM and Bias are closely related. Neither takes into account the fraction of seats won by each party. This aids in the stability of the measures under uniform vote swings, but misses one of, if not the, primary goals of partisan gerrymandering. The outlier elections for MM are heavily skewed towards ones with few competitive races. Among hypothetical elections it does reasonably well in that it marks the proportional and competitive elections as fair. But it only views the classic gerrymander and inverted gerrymander as moderately unusual. As discussed in [War18b] and elsewhere, packing and cracking can occur in such as a way as to be completely missed by MM when the statewide Democratic support deviates even moderately from 50%. It is generally acknowledged that this measure is not useful when statewide support of the two parties is unequal. As discussed in Sections 4.3 and 5, we believe its utility is not even clear to us when statewide support is equal.
Partisan bias performs similarly to MM. It badly misinterprets the competitiveness of the hypothetical competitive election, but gives what we view as reasonable answers for the other hypothetical elections. Among all historical elections it does poorly when the election is not competitive. A large uniform shift takes the election into a realm that is just not relevant. Among competitive elections it does successfully identify two clear gerrymanders in the recent North Carolina House elections.
The efficiency gap has as both a strength and a weakness the fact that it enshrines a historical average as an ideal. By its very definition, any election that deviates far from this ideal is a good subject for further investigation. And as we have seen in this article, the elections it tends to flag as outliers are unusual in some respect (e.g., a large number of very competitive seats). Yet there are also valid reasons for proportionality to deviate from 2-proportionality (e.g., a large number of very competitive seats) and EG is not able to account for these.
We see the declination and buffered declination as robust measures. A major advantage of them, in our view, is that they are agnostic about the slope of the seats-votes curve. They just asks for the differential responsiveness to be low. As a further point of support, Dec increases in absolute value under packing and cracking, as shown in [War18b] . Strong cases can be made that all three of the competitive elections in Figure 8 flagged by BDec as the worst competitive elections are, in fact, egregious partisan gerrymanders. This is clearly true among the non-competitive elections flagged, though purely from the view of the vote distribution, the remaining three elections shown in Figure 8 are extremely unusual. We believe Dec and BDec get all of the hypothetical elections correct. Disadvantages of Dec and BDec are their inability to provide an evaluation when one party sweeps the election and their sensitivity when one party wins only one or two seats. Additionally, there is an implicit assumption that a fair seats-votes curve is linear (whatever the slope). This model frequently begins to break down as one considers states in which one party dominates.
Conclusion
This article has focused on measures that attempt to ascertain how consistent a given vote distribution is with that produced by a partisan gerrymander. This is a narrow framework that intentionally ignores many of the complexities arising in the partisan gerrymandering problem. However, by limiting the scope of what we ask of our measures, we can do a better job of identifying the strengths and weaknesses of each measure as well as what election characteristics are likely to lead to false positives and false negatives. Such errors are inevitable and must be well understood to be dealt with. Once these quantitative issues are carefully addressed, it becomes easier to create reliable ensemble measures or to tackle the much larger task of creating a manageable standard for gerrymandering.
We see many future directions for study. Closely aligned with this paper would be an investigation centered around the elections that send moderate or strong signals as partisan gerrymanders, but not at the level of the extreme outlier. Or flipping the focus completely, examining whether measures are appropriately classifying elections as completely fair. A better understanding of how measures react to different numbers of districts would also be helpful. Another direction concerns the stability issue. This has been explored individually for various measures (see, e.g., [MS15] for the efficiency gap and [War18b] for the declination), but we do not know of a more comprehensive study. Beyond that we broaden into matters such as how partisans are distributed geographically. Such issues are central to how we should interpret the valuations we get as we move towards making real-world decisions using these measures.
While we believe quantitative partisan gerrymandering measures to be important for solving the partisan gerrymandering problem, but they form only one piece of the puzzle. In particular, we expect computer simulations (such as found in [BGH + 17]) and compactness metrics to continue to play a central role. Their absence from this article is only due to the limited scope of this article. Even further afield, remedies such as the creation of independent districting commissions will likely play wider roles in the future.
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